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Between them, the two edited volumes listed above contain a total of twenty-nine analyses of 
various kinds of visual images and displays. Fewer than half of those analyses deal with visual 
material designed explicitly for persuasive purposes, such as political image-making, social 
activism, or commercial advertising. To a reader unfamiliar with the study of rhetoric, this seeming 
neglect of deliberate persuasion might seem puzzling. However, in the world of rhetorical 
scholarship, it is, of course, an old story. For the better part of the past century, people who write 
about rhetoric have been expanding their focus to an ever-widening range of media and contexts. 
A major goal of this expansion has been the desire to understand the workings of the more implicit 
or covert forms of persuasion. As Kristie Fleckenstein argues (echoing Kenneth Burke) in her 
elegant introduction to the volume of which she is co-editor, all communication is rhetorical, 
insofar as it is a means of constructing social reality (9). 
 
The recent publication of several books on visual rhetoric is part of this long-term broadening of 
the scope of rhetorical scholarship.1 In an informative and thought-provoking chapter that is 
presented as an afterword in the Visual Rhetoric reader, Thomas Benson points out that an interest 
in visual media can be traced back to some of the earliest work inspired by the 1925 essay in which 
Herbert Wichelns laid the foundations of contemporary rhetorical criticism (413). What have we 
gained from this embrace of visual communication—and what, if anything, have we lost? The 
gains are, to some extent, self-evident. It is almost axiomatic that mergers between scholarly sub-
disciplines are mutually beneficial as a result of the exchange of methodologies and theoretical 
perspectives. The study of visual communication has also profited significantly from rhetorical 
scholarship’s stronger grounding in history. For example, ten of the Visual Rhetoric reader’s 
twenty chapters deal with visual images originating in the mid-twentieth century or earlier periods. 
As its subtitle implies, this book could serve as an excellent introduction to the history of American 
visual culture—a topic that doesn’t often get good coverage in standard textbooks on visual 
communication. 
 Has the merger between rhetoric and visual communication had any negative consequences? The 
answer to this question depends on what one thinks the goals of such a merger should be. If the 
main goal is simply to show that rhetorical analysis can be applied to images just as productively 
as it is applied to words, then the books under review here have all succeeded spectacularly. 
However, if the study of visual rhetoric is also supposed to result in broader theoretical conclusions 
about the power of images—if it is supposed to tell us what makes images special, in comparison 
with words and other means of communication—then the record of achievement here is more 
equivocal, especially as far as the Visual Rhetoric reader is concerned. Perhaps because they are 
reacting to a perceived verbal bias in communication departments’ approaches to rhetoric, many 
of the authors in that collection seem more concerned with the rhetorical intricacies, complexities, 
and subtleties of specific images than with the generic properties of images as means of persuasive 
communication. As a result, a reader might come away from some of this material with an 
insufficient appreciation of how different visual persuasion can be from its verbal counterpart. 
 
A case in point is Lester Olson’s chapter in the Visual Rhetoric reader, an analysis of two images 
produced by Benjamin Franklin at different points in his journalistic and political career. The first 
image was published on page 2 of the May 9 issue of Franklin’s Pennsylvania Gazette in 1754, 
the first year of the French and Indian War. The image showed a snake sliced into eight pieces, 
each of which was labeled with the initials of a colony or region of British North America, ranging 
from New England at the head to South Carolina at the tail. Underneath the snake was a caption, 
“JOIN, OR DIE.” The second image appears to have been produced in 1766, at a time when 
Franklin was in London, lobbying against the Stamp Act. This image, titled “MAGNA Britannia: 
her Colonies REDUC’D,” portrayed a woman’s body with her arms and legs chopped off and lying 
on the ground beside her. The arms were labeled “Pennsyl” and “New York,” the legs ‘‘Virg-’’ 
and ‘‘New Eng-.’’ The aim of Olson’s analysis is to figure out what exactly Franklin was trying 
to accomplish through the use of these two images. In search of an answer to this question, Olson 
digs deep into the historical archives, sifting through contemporary commentary about the images, 
Franklin’s own statements about them, and the images’ known distribution history. 
 
The outcome of Olson’s analysis is a vivid demonstration of just how profoundly context can affect 
the meaning of a message. He points out that “JOIN, or DIE,” which could be seen as pro-British 
in its original context, came to have the exact opposite connotation when it was later reprinted in 
publications opposing the Stamp Act (334). Conversely, although “MAGNA Britannia” could be 
seen as an appeal for solidarity between Great Britain and her colonies, when Franklin was accused 
of disloyalty to Pennsylvania, the image was used in his defense, as proof of his efforts on behalf 
of the colonies. Olson’s study is an outstanding piece of historical scholarship. It is meticulously 
documented and argued with admirable rigor. It gives us a wealth of information about Franklin’s 
two pictures and their context. However, it tells us almost nothing about pictures in general. After 
I had finished reading it, I found myself wondering how—if at all—Olson’s methods or 
conclusions might have differed if he had been dealing with purely verbal expressions of solidarity, 
such as Franklin’s celebrated admonition about hanging together or hanging separately. Explicit 
answers to such questions are often lacking from the studies in the Visual Rhetoric reader. 
 
All the same, this observation should not be taken as a criticism of Olson or any of the other authors 
under consideration here. It would be both illogical and unfair to criticize someone for not doing 
what he or she did not set out to do. Moreover, if we look between the lines of the specific analyses 
offered in this group of books, it is possible to extract quite substantive contributions towards a 
more theoretical approach to visual rhetoric, even when the authors themselves do not explicitly 
address such matters. In particular, some of these analyses have very productive implications 
regarding three major questions that any theory of visual rhetoric has to grapple with: Do visual 
arguments need captions? Are pictures more emotional than words (and words more informative 
than pictures)? Do photographs provide more trustworthy evidence than words or other kinds of 
pictures? I have tried to phrase these questions as simply as possible. Answering them, however, 
is no simple matter. What we are really trying to get at when we ask such questions is not some 
essential property of images but, rather, how the creators and viewers of images make sense of 
them. In other word s, we are asking empirical questions with necessarily messy answers. 
Moreover, those answer s are constantly changing as visual culture evolves. Visual rhetoric is a 
moving target, and, in an age of rapidly changing digital media, that target’s movements are getting 
faster. 
 
Do Visual Arguments Need Captions? 
 
Are there types of meanings that pictures can’t convey by themselves? In the field of visual 
communication, one of the earliest attempts to deal with this question in detail occurs in an article 
by Sol Worth, a foundational theorist of visual media.2 The article’s title is a succinct statement of 
Worth’s conclusion: “Pictures Can’t Say Ain’t.” Worth was making a basic distinction that others 
have made in more elaborate terminology: language is propositional, images are presentational; 
language has a syntax for making claims about reality; images have no such syntax and are merely 
uninflected representations. Hence, a picture can be a false representation, but it has no means of 
asserting its falseness. An example that may seem to be a textbook proof of Worth’s point is the 
now notorious New Yorker cover of July 21, 2008, featuring Barack Obama dressed as a Muslim, 
Michelle Obama in sixties radical hair-do and vaguely revolutionary attire, a picture of a somewhat 
Osama-bin-Laden-esque man on the wall, and the Stars and Stripes burning in the fireplace. In the 
criticism that followed the publication of this image, it was often noted that there should have been 
a caption of some sort to explain that this was supposed to be a portrayal of Obama’s opponents’ 
lies about him, not the cartoonist’s or the New Yorker’s actual beliefs. (In fact, the magazine’s 
contents page did list a title for the cover illustration: “The Politics of Fear.”) For example, 
according to Los Angeles Times blogger Andrew Malcolm, “[a] problem is there’s no caption on 
the cover to ensure that everyone gets the ha-ha-we’ve-collected-almost-every-cliched-rumor-
about-Obama-in-one-place-in-order-to-make-fun-of-them punchline.”3 Q.E.D., it would seem. 
 
But was the Obama cartoon’s miscommunication really a result of the limitations of pictures, or 
did it stem from broader difficulties confronting all forms of satire? After all, one of the most 
prominent instances of misperceived satire in U.S. culture is the purely verbal case of Huckleberry 
Finn, whose sardonic portrayal of the speech patterns of nineteenth-century racists has ended up 
offending many contemporary readers’ racial sensitivities. The problem with Worth’s argument—
and with similar approaches to visual theory—is that it treats visual communication as if its 
properties were determined by some inherent, unchanging essence, instead of the ever-mutating 
conventions of the users of visual media. Although it may be true that pictures don’t have an 
explicit, standardized counterpart of verbal negation or of other features of verbal syntax, it is also 
true that artists, filmmakers, and other creators of images have a long history of attempts to cobble 
together propositional structures with the means at their disposal. The two collections reviewed 
here contain several analyses of such structures. Taken together, these analyses hint at an intriguing 
conclusion about this aspect of visual rhetoric: far from being a limitation, the lack of an explicit 
propositional syntax may actually be one of the distinguishing strengths of images when they are 
used as means of persuasion. 
 
Advertising in all its forms (including political ads and social advocacy videos) has always been a 
fecund source of experimentation in the construction of visual arguments through the juxtaposition 
of images. This kind of experimentation,that has accelerated since the advent of widely affordable 
computer-based editing systems in the 1990s, is dissected at length in Ronald Shields’s 
contribution to the Visual Rhetoric reader, a study of Apple’s 1997 advertising campaign, “Think 
Different.” In the video commercial that is the focus of Shields’s analysis, we see a series of 
seventeen images of famous innovators (Albert Einstein, Bob Dylan, Martin Luther King Jr., etc.), 
followed by an unidentified young girl, and concluding with the Apple logo. The voice-over 
narration salutes “the crazy ones,” “misfits,” “rebels,” etc., and concludes, “The people who are 
crazy enough to think they can change the world, are the ones who do. ‘Think Different’” (283). 
Superficially, one could claim that this is an example of pictures aping the structure of a verbal 
argument. As the narrator delivers his recitation of all the worthy things that innovators do (“see 
things differently,” “change things,” “push the human race forward,” etc.), the ad’s visual part 
provides a concrete exemplar of the soundtrack’s abstractions. However, as Shields’s analysis 
shows, this way of interpreting the ad ignores a major component of its message. 
 
At the same time that the images mirror the words, they also perform an entirely different function 
that has no counterpart on the verbal side of the divide. Because of perceptual habits cultivated by 
the dominant role of movies and other visual narratives in our visual culture, all viewers are primed 
to see sequences of images as bits of stories, even when those image are also connected in more 
symbolic or conceptual ways (as in this ad). Shields demonstrates this process with a highly erudite 
deconstruction of the relationship between two adjacent images in the Apple ad, of opera singer 
Maria Callas and spiritual leader Mohandas Gandhi. The archival footage of Callas shows her 
blowing a kiss. Shields identifies the one opera in Callas’s repertory that featured a “dramatically 
significant” kiss, Richard Wagner’s Parsifal, and notes that the intended recipient of that kiss, 
Parsifal, is a holy knight who achieves spiritual purity through fasting and self-renunciation—
qualities which are also associated with our image of Gandhi. 
 
From there, Shields goes on to make further intricate, albeit well-grounded, connections between 
this sequence and Apple’s “1984” commercial, but, for our purposes, the essential point is his 
illumination of the double layer of significance and interconnection that is operating in the “Think 
Different” ad’s sequence of images: on the one hand, an argument about thinking differently; on 
the other hand, a series of stories. The perceived narrative connections will clearly vary depending 
on each viewer’s previous level of knowledge about each of the figures in the ad. Obviously, few 
viewers can be expected to know as much about the specific example of Maria Callas as Shields 
does. However, as Shields indicates through a quotation from one of the ad’s creators, it is quite 
likely that this kind of open-endedness was a deliberate feature of the ad. Indeed, it is more than 
likely that such viewer-specific connections are actively pursued by advertisers. Advertisers are 
well aware that personalized narratives are unusually effective memory devices. Consequently, the 
fact that viewers may bring a narrative bias to images can be seen as an enhancement of—rather 
than an impediment to—the potential use of images in propositional constructions. One layer of 
meaning makes the argument; the other layer of meaning makes the argument memorable. 
 
 The capacity for such double-layered meanings may be less obvious when pictorial arguments are 
constructed by juxtaposing two or more images in a single picture, rather than in sequence over 
time. However, an essay by Robert Hariman and John Lucaites in the Visual Rhetoric reader 
contains a clear illustration of this possibility. As in their recent book, No Caption Needed: Iconic 
Photographs, Public Culture, and Liberal Democracy, the authors frame this essay as a response 
to the ‘‘hermeneutics of suspicion’’ that has characterized some notable academic commentary on 
the role of images in the public sphere (175).4 Their goal is to show that, while photojournalistic 
images may be ‘‘merely supplemental to the task of reporting the news’’ (176), they provide the 
public with opportunities for common spectatorship that are vital to the shaping of conceptions of 
civic identity. In this particular essay, Hariman and Lucaites examine AP photographer Nick Ut’s 
iconic image of Vietnamese children fleeing a napalm explosion. Their dissection of this image 
and its reception brings to light a host of disquieting details—such as the fact that the soldiers in 
the image’s background appear to be treating this gut-wrenching scene as a routine occurrence—
but for our purposes, the more relevant part of the authors’ discussion has to do with a protest 
visual from a Web site by a Vietnam veteran, Ed Chilton. 
 
 Titled ‘‘Veritatis Vietnam,’’ the visual is a composite of three superimposed images: Nick Ut’s 
photograph, the American flag, and the face of Francis Cardinal Spellman, Archbishop of New 
York during the Vietnam War and strong supporter of U.S. involvement in that conflict. Hariman 
and Lucaites observe that this superimposition of images doesn’t merely compare the past with the 
present (i.e., the moment of the viewer’s confrontation with this image on the Web site where it is 
displayed). Rather, it fuses them: ‘‘[T]he image of terror and guilt now is always within the flag, 
an ineradicable part of the United States’s legacy’’ (186). But it seems perfectly appropriate to 
argue beyond their claim, and to say that, in addition to the conceptual fusion that they highlight, 
the image also invites us to see the figures of the children fused into the same physical space as 
the cardinal. Viewed in this light, the image becomes a portrayal of the cardinal--who is in the 
foreground--literally turning his back on the children in the background. In other words, once again 
we are dealing with an implicit story line. In contrast to some of the potential interpretations 
entertained in Shields’s analysis of the Apple commercial, this perception of a narrative connection 
between the cardinal and the children seems likely to have been intended quite consciously by the 
image’s designer. 
 
Even when implicit narrative is not as prominent a factor, propositional sequences of images can 
accomplish another goal that is less available to words. This aspect of visual rhetoric is illustrated 
in Barbara Biesecker’s analysis of various commemorations of World War II, in another of the 
chapters in the Visual Rhetoric reader. In the course of this analysis, one of the texts Biesecker 
discusses is The Greatest Generation, Tom Brokaw’s best-selling collection of life stories of 
people who lived through the war and the depression before it. A major theme of Brokaw’s 1999 
book was that this self-sacrificing and uncomplaining generation has been succeeded by social 
fragmentation and self-interest. Biesecker characterizes the book as ‘‘a vicious attack on today’s 
identity politics, using history as an alibi for a civics lesson that instructs its readership to turn a 
blind eye to the social differences that still make a difference’’ (162). Writing from a diametrically 
opposite perspective--but confirming Biesecker’s interpretation--a highly rated Amazon reviewer 
says,‘‘The one clear difference between that generation and subsequent ones can be summed up 
in two words: no whining.’’5  
 
After commenting on the book’s text, Biesecker turns her attention to one of the book’s major 
attractions, a series of over a hundred photographs assembled from the personal collections of the 
individuals featured in the book. In each case, there is at least one photograph taken before that 
person’s return from the war, and one taken long after. This type of visual structure--a series of 
contrasts, one after the other--has become a fairly stable rhetorical convention. Biesecker interprets 
it as an obvious attempt to authenticate the verbal text, but then she makes an additional 
observation. She notes that the book’s concluding seventeen vignettes feature fourteen white men, 
two white women, and one ‘‘model minority’’ (164), Hawaii Senator Daniel Inouye. Interestingly, 
this observation is at odds with the lesson that Amazon’s favorable review derives from the book: 
‘‘[T]hese people were far more diverse than we today have given them credit for. . . . Their values 
and lifestyles were about as diverse as those we find in our new century.’’6 
 
If Biesecker’s implied interpretation is valid, this is a case in which the visual syntax undercuts 
the stated message of diversity. It is also a particularly apt illustration of an important principle: 
precisely because of its presumed lack of propositional properties, visual communication has an 
element of deniability that is absent from words. The implications that Biesecker sees in those 
seventeen vignettes are not spelled out verbally; if they were, they might have met with greater 
resistance from other readers. To return one more time to the topic of Obama iconology, it could 
be argued that a similar logic was present in the anti-Obama video in which his image was 
juxtaposed with those of Paris Hilton and Britney Spears. The ad’s verbalized message was that 
Obama is an even bigger star than they, but is not ready to lead the country. However, it doesn’t 
seem far-fetched to assume that the images were also intended to imply an unspoken analogy to 
other, less flattering qualities of Hilton and Spears than their stardom. 
 
 Are Pictures More Emotional than Words? 
 
This idea may be the most widely shared preconception about the differences between these two 
modes of communication. In discussions of broadcast news, it has become almost a commonplace 
that words convey the information while pictures arouse the emotions. According to the evidence 
contained in Thomas Ferstle’s Assessing Visual Rhetoric, aspects of this idea also seem to be 
reflected in pedagogical practices. Ferstle’s book is based on his PhD dissertation. In graduate 
school, he worked as a teaching assistant on a freshman composition course that included an 
assignment in visual rhetoric. Students were expected to combine images and words in this project. 
As an aspiring educator, Ferstle was concerned about the criteria used to evaluate the students’ 
visual compositions, and his dissertation was a study of how the teaching assistants in this large 
class conducted these evaluations. The study was based on detailed, open-ended interviews, in 
which the teaching assistants were asked to explicate the factors that they had used in assessing 
the verbal and the visual aspects of the assignments. According to these interviews, the 
introduction of a visual component made it difficult for the graders to apply traditional criteria 
such as clarity or coherence in their evaluations. Instead, they found themselves resorting to more 
‘‘holistic’’ judgments based on emotional impact or aesthetic qualities. In short, they seemed to 
be reflecting, and perhaps reproducing, the prevailing cultural understanding of how pictures differ 
from words. 
  Even if it’s true that, in practice, our culture associates images with emotion, is there any reason 
to think that one mode is more emotional than the other in principle? Doesn’t it depend on how 
pictures or words are actually used? Isn’t the history of verbal oratory full of utterances that are as 
soul-stirring as any visual display? ‘‘I have a dream’’;‘‘The only thing we have to fear is fear itself 
’’; ‘‘Give me liberty, or give me death!’’ One of the reasons such questions are so difficult to 
answer is that emotion itself can be such a nebulous concept. However, it has become much less 
nebulous in recent communication research informed by cognitive science. From this perspective, 
while it remains true that any form of artistic communication can excite the emotions if used 
skillfully, it also seems true that representational images possess certain means of eliciting emotion 
that are not available to verbal language.7 This is not the place for a detailed examination of that 
literature. Its implications for rhetorical scholarship may be better appreciated in the context of 
reviewing related research on visual rhetoric. 
 
Caroline van Eck’s authoritative, learned, beautifully argued study of early modern European 
visual art traces the influence of classical rhetoric on the theories and practices of Italian and 
English painters, sculptors, and architects. Her book begins with a well-documented demonstration 
of a point that she makes very insistently: far from being a recent invention, visual rhetoric is 
envisioned explicitly and in considerable detail in the work of several Greek and Roman writers, 
Aristotle not excluded. Van Eck’s primary interest is in the Romans, such as Quintilian and Cicero, 
from whose writings she extracts a wealth   precepts for the effective use of gesture, props, setting, 
and other visual variables that were available to classical oratory. Then, in a chapter titled ‘‘How 
to Achieve Persuasion in Painting: The Common Ground,’’ she investigates the adaptation of 
classical thought to the ecclesiastical art of the Italian Renaissance. 
 
This is the part of her book that is most directly related to present-day cognitivist research on visual 
rhetoric (a connection drawn by me, not by van Eck herself). Van Eck notes, ‘‘In early modern 
Europe the main purpose of visual persuasion was to move viewers and incite them to virtuous 
action on the basis of emotional identification with what was depicted’’ (55). Drawing on a formula 
from Horace’s Ars Poetica, Renaissance artists considered the basis or ‘‘conditio sine qua non of 
visual persuasion’’ to be ‘‘the identification of the viewer with what is represented, resulting in a 
sense of living presence’’ (56). This conception led to a number of specific visual strategies, 
including the following three: first, the inclusion in a painting of a character who observes the 
main action and exhibits the emotional reaction that the viewer is expected to have toward it; 
second, the use of linear perspective to create the illusion of a real space into which the viewer 
might be able to enter; and, third, the use of various trompe-l’oeil devices to create an illusion of 
continuity between the painting and the real space (usually, a church) in which it was exhibited. 
 
All three of these strategies are in evidence in van Eck’s first example of this aspect of Italian 
painting, a fresco of the Holy Trinity painted by Masaccio in the church of Santa Maria Novella 
in Florence. Dating from the mid to late 1420s, this wall painting is often considered the first fully 
realized application of Renaissance formulae for linear perspective. It is a depiction of Christ on 
the cross, supported by God, and attended by the Virgin Mary, Saint John the Evangelist, and the 
worshipping figures of the Florentine husband and wife who had commissioned Masaccio’s work. 
These last two characters are portrayed as if they were in the real space of the church looking into 
a niche enclosing the image’s main subject, and the illusion of a real space within the image itself 
is enhanced by the use of very precise linear perspective. Standing by the side of the cross, Mary 
points at her son but looks out at the viewer ‘‘with a resigned gesture that accords with her 
expression of stoic forbearance’’ (17). 
 
The efficacy of this last strategy--portraying a character who looks out of a picture at the viewer 
and displays the emotions that the picture is trying to elicit--was, of course, considered intuitively 
obvious by the writers who laid the foundations for Masaccio’s usage and the artists who 
subsequently embraced the convention in their own work. However, this is one area in which 
contemporary cognitive research allows us to arrive at a firmer conclusion. There appears to be 
good evidence in support of the assumption that emotional ‘‘mirroring’’ is an essential ingredient 
of adequate social functioning in real life, and that there is actually a neurobiological basis for this 
type of response.8 In other words, in adapting this aspect of emotional response for pictorial 
purposes, the creators of images are using a rhetorical strategy whose efficacy is, in a sense, 
‘‘guaranteed,’’ and eliciting emotion in a way that words cannot possibly replicate.  
 
A similar argument can be made about the use of linear perspective and other illusionistic devices 
as means of drawing the spectator into the picture. As van Eck points out, one of the most central 
lessons that Renaissance artists drew from classical rhetoric was the importance of establishing a 
‘‘common ground’’ between the speaker and the audience. By extension, pictorial perspective was 
considered a means of creating the illusion of a literal common ground--a space that the viewer 
might enter. Few topics in art history have generated as much confusion as the illusionism of linear 
perspective. Since as early as the 1920s, writers of various persuasions have been arguing that 
linear perspective is a cultural construction with little or no basis in anything that we could call 
‘‘objective’’ or even ‘‘real.’’9 In the face of mounting evidence from research on visual perception, 
such a position has become increasingly tenuous.10 However, somewhat more recently, the idea of 
perspective as cultural construction has acquired a new twist, which is present in several of the 
essays in the Fleckenstein, Hum, and Calendrillo collection. Inspired by the writings of Martin 
Jay, among others, this view of ‘‘Cartesian perspectivalism’’ is premised on a series of 
assumptions--or perhaps ‘‘axioms’’ would be a better word--that are spelled out very lucidly in a 
chapter by Sue Hum.11 
 
According to these assumptions, perspective creates a ‘‘detached observer’’ who ‘‘remains 
ostensibly disinterested’’ (109), thus taking on the ‘‘unmarked, normative position of Western 
civilization: a white, Eurocentric, middle-class heterosexual male’’ (111), becoming 
‘‘complicitous with bourgeois ideology’’ (110), thus eliminating ‘‘deep differences, such as race, 
gender, class, and sexual-orientation’’ (111). That’s saying a lot for linear perspective, and it’s 
hard to see on what grounds we could either prove or disprove such a list of claims (were we so 
inclined). However, on the one issue that serves as the starting point for this chain of suppositions-
-namely, the idea that perspective somehow creates a detached observer--van Eck’s documentation 
of the historical evidence suggests that this argument is flat-out wrong. In its original context in 
fifteenth-century Italy, the immediate goal of perspective was to involve, not to disembody. In 
present-day visual media, illusionistic devices such as 3D or ‘‘invisible editing’’ create the 
common ground on which emotion can build and persuasion can take hold. To the extent that old 
and new illusionistic devices are based on the ‘‘built-in’’ properties of human vision, the media 
that employ them are--as with emotional mirroring-- doing something that words literally, 
physically, cannot do. 
 Are Words More Informative than Pictures? 
 
In a sense, then, visual communication can indeed be considered more emotional than language, 
but only to the extent that it has a wider arsenal of emotional devices at its disposal. Is there a sense 
in which words are, conversely, more adept at conveying information? The two properties of 
language that are most often associated with that claim are its complex propositional syntax and 
its capacity for abstraction. While visual approximations of propositional syntax are, as we have 
seen, effective rhetorical devices, they cannot come close to the complexity of expression made 
possible by verbal syntax. When Sergei Eisenstein, luminary of early Soviet cinema and major 
theorist of film editing, predicted that filmmakers would one day be able to rewrite Das Kapital in 
the form of visual montage, he was essentially proving the opposite point through the 
preposterousness of his example.12 If pictures can’t match the informational properties of verbal 
syntax, how do they stand with regard to abstraction? All words are abstract, and by virtue of that 
abstraction, they are means of organizing social reality and moving from the particular to the 
general. Many kinds of images--for example, all photographs--are concrete. However, pictures do 
have the capacity for abstraction, as demonstrated by directional arrows, some traffic signs, some 
computer screen icons, and so on. One of the notable strengths of the Fleckenstein, Hum, and 
Calendrillo collection is its inclusion of several chapters dealing with the use of abstract pictures 
for informational or scientific purposes. 
 
In the course of a wide-ranging survey of various forms of scientific visualization, such as X-rays, 
maps, and spectroscopic read-outs, Don Ihde makes a useful distinction between two large 
categories of pictures: on the one hand, what he calls ‘‘isomorphic images’’--pictures whose 
contents we can recognize on the basis of our everyday perceptual habits--and, on the other hand, 
‘‘non-isomorphic images’’ whose interpretation requires familiarity with a specific code. He 
illustrates this distinction by recalling his first encounter with Ice Age cave paintings: while he 
was immediately able to recognize the shapes of animals, he was completely baffled by ‘‘some 
abstract marks in ochre reds, somewhat like spears’’ (33). Ihde’s broader point is that the latter 
type of image is essentially language-like: it is read, not perceived, and, in its scientific uses, its 
properties are closer to those of language than to those of isomorphic pictures.  
 
However, Ihde may be overstating this similarity. While it is incontestably true that certain kinds 
of visual abstraction cannot be interpreted without specialized knowledge, it by no means follows 
that such abstractions adhere to a totally arbitrary code, as in the case of language. In a penetrating 
discussion of the differences between language and abstract scientific visuals, Alan Gross points 
out that the latter characteristically retain some element of ‘‘isomorphism’’ or analogy to the 
objects or processes they are meant to help us understand. However, the analogy is selective, 
highlighting only those features that are crucial to thehypotheses that are being considered. 
Moreover, as Gross convincingly illustrates through a detailed look at diagrams used by Charles 
Darwin, such pictorial abstractions are so vital to the development of science that it makes no sense 
to make a greater claim for pictures or words in assessments of scientific advances: ‘‘[O]nly the 
fusion of words and pictures can overcome the limitations of each in disclosing and explaining 
relevant aspects of the world’’ (62). 
 
Gross’s vigorous defense of abstract images is a bracing corrective to conventional views on these 
matters. But what about fully concrete, photographic images? Perhaps one reason for the 
traditional dim view of their role in informational media is that we expect our information to come 
in readily digestible abstractions. When confronted with the density of detail that photographs are 
capable of, we demand voice-over or captions to tell us what we’re seeing. Perhaps the least 
persuasive essays in the two edited collections are those that try to impose a reductive 
interpretation on the variety and flux of the images that they are ostensibly analyzing. In the lead 
chapter of the Visual Rhetoric reader, Reginald Twigg offers his views on a number of images 
from How the Other Half Lives, Jacob Riis’s landmark account of New York tenement life in the 
late 1800s. One of the images Twigg discusses is of a family from Bohemia (now part of the Czech 
Republic) engaged in cigar-making in their home. In the version that appears on page 113 of the 
Barnes &Noble edition of this book (a variant of the image presented in Twigg’s essay), the parents 
perform their tasks sitting next to each other at a work table, while the family’s two boys look 
directly at the camera. The older boy, who also appears to be working, has a baleful expression on 
his face. This boy is barefoot, but in other respects, the members of the family appear to be wearing 
adequate clothing. The room has two large windows, which are both partially open, providing a 
view of another building across the street. In the background, we see what appears to be a 
sideboard, and several indistinct objects hang on the walls.13 
 
Without discussing any of these material details, Twigg makes the following claim: ‘‘While on 
the surface the image looks benign--merely a hard-working family earning its living--its 
metonymy contains many elements subversive of middle-class ideals’’(27).  Because of the 
contrast between this family and the ideal middle-class family that (presumably) springs to the 
viewer’s mind from a perusal of this image, this family was ‘‘appropriated’’ by Riis to ‘‘naturalize 
the middle-class family and its attendant gender, generational, and age relations by ‘illustrating’ 
the ‘dangers’ of any subversion of it’’ (28). Maybe this is true, but then again, maybe it isn’t. How 
would we know? How does Twigg know that this is what the image meant to Riis or to any of his 
viewers? Here are some of the things Riis’s text says about the Bohemian cigar-makers: ‘‘In the 
Bohemian quarter [the tenement] is made the vehicle for enforcing upon a proud race a slavery as 
real as any that ever disgraced the South.’’14 
 
But what of his being an Anarchist, this Bohemian--an infidel--I hear somebody say. 
Almost one might be persuaded . . . to retort: what more natural? With every hand raised 
against him in the old land and the new, in the land of his hoped-for freedom, what more 
logical than that his [hand] should be turned against society that seems to exist only for his 
oppression? . . . Naturally the Bohemian loves peace, as he loves music and song. As 
someone has said: He does not seek war, but when attacked knows better how to die than 
to surrender.15 
 
These are selective quotations, from a book that veers almost frenetically from denunciations of 
the ‘‘greed of capital’’ to the most appalling racial stereotypes.16 How does Twigg know that it is 
Riis’s bourgeois, prejudiced voice that speaks through the image of the Bohemian cigar--makers, 
rather than the angry, exploitation-hating voice that could easily be mistaken for that of an 
impassioned rabble-rouser? More important, why is Twigg so sure that only one of these voices 
can adequately contain the image’s possible meanings?  
 
Photographs as Proof 
 
Both Twigg’s and Biesecker’s essays deal with photographs that were used as evidence in support 
of the argument in a written text. Somewhat surprisingly, though, this aspect of visual rhetoric--
the use of photographs as proof--is not a major theme of any of these books. Perhaps visual scholars 
have grown weary of the somewhat repetitive debate that has attended the development of 
computerized photo-manipulation: on the one side, concerns about potential fakery; on the other 
side, reminders that all photographs present a selective version of reality.17 However, the Visual 
Rhetoric reader does include two chapters in which the evidentiary power of images is a central 
concern, and both chapters make important contributions to the general topic. 
 
Christine Harold and Kevin Michael DeLuca describe the emotional impact and social aftereffects 
of an image of grotesque violence: the photograph of Emmett Till’s dead body lying in his coffin. 
After the open-casket memorial service that his mother had insisted on, the photograph of his 
horrifically mangled face was published in Jet and in several other newspapers and periodicals. 
Harold and DeLuca document the impact of that image by citing the experiences of several now-
prominent African Americans whose lives were affected profoundly when they saw it. Perhaps the 
most striking of these is the following statement by Molefi Kete Asante, a leader in the 
development of African American studies as an academic discipline: ‘‘My life’s pilgrimage, in 
many respects, has been to seek liberation from the moment of Till’s death’’ (263). However, with 
respect to the difference between images and words, the two most significant findings of this study 
are as follows. First, even though African Americans living outside the South had heard verbal 
accounts of the perils that black people faced there at the time, it was the photograph that ‘‘allowed 
viewers to become witness to what for many had existed only as rumor and legend’’ (264). Second, 
the venue where the photograph first appeared in print, Jet magazine, contributed significantly to 
its truth value. According to a former associate of the magazine, ‘‘People in the black community 
have said for years, there’s a motto: ‘If it wasn’t in Jet, it didn’t happen’’’ (269). In a sense, that 
says it all: on the one hand, a photograph does provide a truth that language can’t; on the other 
hand-- somewhat contradictorily, perhaps--the guarantor of that truth is the photograph’s source 
(i.e., not the medium itself). 
 
However, the tragedy of Emmett Till occurred more than half a century ago. In a world of digital 
media, how have attitudes towards photography been influenced by the development of more 
efficient methods of image manipulation? As noted, digital imaging is not a major theme of these 
books. However, by delving even further back into the past, Cara Finnegan’s chapter in the Visual 
Rhetoric reader provides a fascinating case study of one way in which people’s beliefs about 
photographic truth can be shaped by changing circumstances. Finnegan’s chapter examines 
viewers’ responses to a photograph of Abraham Lincoln that was published for the first time in 
McClure’s magazine in 1895. According to his son, who gave the original daguerreotype to 
McClure’s, this was the earliest known photograph of Lincoln. Moreover, this was not the Lincoln 
that the public of 1895 was familiar with (or that we are familiar with today), but a much younger 
man very different in his appearance. Finnegan points out that the best-known early portrait of 
Lincoln, taken in 1857, shows him as ‘‘a raw frontier lawyer having what may only be described 
as a bad hair day’’(65). In the newly discovered daguerreotype, on the other hand, he was 
immaculately attired and groomed (and beardless), with a ‘‘dignified, reserved’’ expression (65). 
 
As S.S. McClure, the magazine’s publisher, had anticipated, the publication of Lincoln’s 
photograph (reproduced in halftone from the daguerreotype) generated tremendous interest from 
readers, swelling the magazine’s circulation and eliciting an outpouring of letters to the editor. 
Sifting through this correspondence, Finnegan eventually draws our attention to one particular 
pattern: the attempt to draw conclusions about the young Lincoln’s personality on the basis of his 
physical appearance and expression. As Finnegan puts it, the letters are based on the assumption 
that there was a ‘‘direct correspondence between Lincoln’s image and his ‘natural traits’’’(67). 
She quotes one of several highly educated letter-writers, the president of MIT, who wrote, 
 
The present picture has distinctly helped me to understand the relation between Mr. 
Lincoln’s face and his mind and character. . . . To my eye it explains Mr. Lincoln far more 
than the most elaborate line-engraving which has been produced. (62) 
 
Where did this belief in a ‘‘direct correspondence’’ between image and character come from? 
According to Finnegan, here we have a case of scientific trends influencing picture perception. 
The late nineteenth century was a time of belief in the ‘‘science’’ of physiognomy--the theory that 
the physical shape of one’s face is related to one’s personality. It would appear that the interpreters 




I have tried to show that, taken as a whole, the essays and analyses in the four books under 
consideration here provide productive answers to certain basic theoretical questions about visual 
rhetoric. These questions are all concerned with the means of persuasion available to images and, 
more specifically, the differences between images and words in this regard. Having looked at 
theory, it may be useful to end this review with a brief comment about evidence and method. After 
I had read Cara Finnegan’s study of responses to the photograph of Abraham Lincoln, I was 
somewhat surprised to find that interest in scientific physiognomy has recently experienced 
something of a revival, albeit on grounds that are more attuned to contemporary attitudes toward 
biology, psychology, and scientific evidence.18 At the same time, students in some areas of 
communication and psychology are being exposed to ‘‘softer’’ versions of physiognomic theory, 
in the form of hypotheses about such things as the facial indicators of mendacity.19 An 
experimentally inclined researcher might be able to concoct a test of Finnegan’s theory using such 
viewers.  
 
Finnegan herself has elsewhere made it clear that she does not consider that type of empirical 
research to be a necessary component of the study of visual rhetoric, and she may be right.20 Still, 
there are many ways of buttressing an argument with evidence, short of conducting a full-blown 
empirical test. The most convincing studies in these four books are those--such as Finnegan’s--
that look at how real people responded to the images that the writer is analyzing and theorizing 
about. We live in an age that expects grand claims to be made about the power of images, and the 
less obvious those claims are, the more some people are impressed by them. In such an intellectual 
climate, theory may need a bit of evidence now and then to keep flights of fancy under control. 
That evidence need not take the form of verbal testimony. One of the strongest theoretical chapters 
in the Visual Rhetoric reader is Janis Edwards and Carol Winkler’s analysis of the Iwo Jima flag-
raising image, using various cartoon parodies as clues to the meanings it has had in American 
visual culture. All the same, having spent an entire essay highlighting the powers of images, it is 
somewhat sobering to be reminded how effectively a well-crafted verbal comment can express a 
viewer’s response. 
 
An outstanding illustration of this possibility is included in Charles Morris and John Sloop’s article 
on queer public kissing. The article as a whole is an engaging discussion of the underappreciated 
importance of man-on-man public kissing as a political performance that is ‘‘central to the 
prospects of a queer world’’ (80). Although the authors argue this point in detail and support their 
argument with a variety of good evidence, the most compelling expression of their argument--to 
my eyes, at least--comes at the very beginning of the chapter, where they quote a 
filmmaker/reviewer’s reaction to a scene in which the two dudes of Dude, Where’s My Car? 
engage in a lengthy tongue kiss (for narrative reasons that are too complicated to bother 
explaining). Here is the reviewer’s comment:  
 
The actors neither overplay nor underplay the moment and show no visible trace of disgust 
or regret afterward. I was almost in tears. This one scene does more to advance the cause 
of homosexuality than 25 years of gay activism. (80)  
 
And, one might add, this one comment does more to prove Morris and Sloop’s point than many 
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